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非对称信息条件下行政成本控制研究

发表时间:2010-11-15  浏览量:1436  下载量:428
全部作者: 郭伟,楚湘华
作者单位: 深圳第二高级技工学校信息管理系
摘 要: 分析政府行政成本中的非对称信息问题,运用委托代理理论探讨存在道德风险的情况下,作为委托人的上级政府或部门如何激励作为代理人的下级政府或部门降低行政成本。通过问题的假设,构建行政成本控制的委托代理模型,运用遗传算法(genetic algorithm,GA)进行仿真计算,得出最优合同激励因子。
关 键 词: 数量经济;非对称信息;委托代理理论;行政成本;遗传算法
Title: Research on the administrative cost control model under the condition of asymmetric information
Author: GUO Wei, CHU Xianghua
Organization: Information Management Department, Shenzhen Second Senior Technical School
Abstract: In this paper, the condition of asymmetry information in government administrative cost control is analyzed. The problem is modeled as a principal-agent model. Then the issue of how the upper-level government encourages the lower-level government to reduce the administrative cost initiatively under the moral hazard situation is discussed. Through assumption and abstraction of this problem, an incentive mechanism is constructed by designing a contract. The genetic algorithm is used to do the simulation and the optimal contract coefficients are worked out. The result shows that administrative cost is saved effectively.
Key words: quantitative economics asymmetric information; principal-agent theory; administrative cost; genetic algorithm
发表期数: 2010年11月第21期
引用格式: 郭伟,楚湘华. 非对称信息条件下行政成本控制研究[J]. 中国科技论文在线精品论文,2010,3(21):2261-2265.
 
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