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服务外包供应链质量协调策略研究
发表时间：2013-05-31 浏览量：1425 下载量：648
| 全部作者： | 李永飞，苏秦，郑婧 |
| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学管理学院，机械制造系统工程国家重点实验室，过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室；陕煤化物资集团彬长分公司 |
| 摘 要： | 研究了服务外包供应链服务提供商出现质量问题时，需支付违约金的提供商与发包方博弈问题。首先，研究了服务外包任何一方，只考虑自身利益的单位数量违约金的协调范围和最优问题；其次，基于供应链整体利益，构建了优化后的协调范围，求解了供应链协调的均衡单位违约金的数量。研究表明：服务外包中的任何一方，若只考虑自身利益最优，而不考虑对方利益，双方无稳定均衡解。若双方同时考虑自身利益最优，而不考虑对方利益，则双方可能陷入囚徒困境，即使双方有均衡解，均衡解也与供应链整体利益均衡解一致。因此，双方只有基于供应链整体利益考虑，才有稳定均衡解。这里不但得出了可协调的范围，而且求解了稳定均衡解的大小。以上结论均与事实相符，对实践具有一定的理论指导价值。 |
| 关 键 词： | 管理理论；供应链；服务外包；质量；委托-代理理论；协调 |
| Title： | Study on quality coordination strategy of the service outsourcing supply chain |
| Author： | LI Yongfei, SU Qin, ZHENG Jing |
| Organization： | Key Lab of the Ministry of Education for Process Control & Efficiency Engineering, State Key Laboratory for Manufacturing Systems Engineering, School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University; Binchang Branch of Shaanxi Coal Chemical Materials Group Co., Ltd. |
| Abstract： | Our research problem of the outsourcing supply chain quality game is that the service provider needs to pay how much per unit penalty quantity to the outsourcer when the service provider has the quality problem because of his own reasons. Firstly, we studied the the coordination scope of per unit penalty quantity and the optimal per unit penalty quantity problem with only considering their own interests of any party of the service outsourcing. Secondly, we constructed the optimal coordination scope based on the overall interests of the supply chain and solved the equilibrium penalty quantity under the supply chain coordination. The results showed that if any party of the service outsourcing only considered its own best interests and regardless of the interests of the opposite party, they will not have stable equilibrium solution. If the parties simultaneously took into account their own best interests without taking into account each other’s interests, then the parties might fall into prisoner’s dilemma. Even if the two sides had a equilibrium solution, the equilibrium solution was also the same to the equilibrium solution of the supply chain. Therefore, the two sides had a stable equilibrium solution based on taking into account the overall interests of the supply chain of the two sides. This research obtained not only the scope of coordination, and solved the stable equilibrium solution size as well. These conclusions are consistent with the facts and have some theoretical guidance value in practice. |
| Key words： | management theory; supply chain; service outsourcing; quality; principal-agent theory; coordination |
| 发表期数： | 2013年5月第10期 |
| 引用格式： | 李永飞，苏秦，郑婧. 服务外包供应链质量协调策略研究[J]. 中国科技论文在线精品论文，2013，6（10）：889-896. |
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