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企业环保激励机制分析——基于委托—代理理论

发表时间:2009-03-15  浏览量:1473  下载量:533
全部作者: 刘旭,刘雪,雷霆,马中
作者单位: 中国人民大学环境学院
摘 要: 为了解决政府激励企业进行环保过程中所存在的信息不对称性问题,通过对政府环保部门与企业之间博弈关系的分析,并以信息经济学中的委托—代理理论为依托,建立理想模型,对模型进行数学求解,以提出有效激励机制,解决政府在激励企业进行主动环保时所面临的一系列问题。此外,结合我国企业进行环境保护的实际情况,分析该激励机制在实际操作过程中与理想模型之间存在的差距及应做的调整。
关 键 词: 环境经济学;委托—代理;政府;企业;激励环保
Title: Analysis on stimulation mechanism of enterprise environmental protection based on the principal-agent theory
Author: LIU Xu, LIU Xue, LEI Ting, MA Zhong
Organization: School of Environment and Natural Resources, Renmin University of China
Abstract: In order to solve the problems of asymmetric information while government stimulates enterprises to protect the environment, by the analysis of the game relationship between government and enterprises, this paper has made an ideal model based on the principle-agent theory and built an efficient stimulating mechanism. Then it conducted the mathematic solutions to the models so that to solve a series of problems faced by government when it stimulates enterprises to do active environmental protection. In addition, based on the realities of environmental protection carried out by enterprises in China, it has analyzed the gap between the ideal and factual condition and recommended some measures for adjustment.
Key words: environmental economics; principle-agent; government; enterprise; stimulation to the protection of environment
发表期数: 2009年3月第5期
引用格式: 刘旭,刘雪,雷霆,等. 企业环保激励机制分析——基于委托—代理理论[J]. 中国科技论文在线精品论文,2009,2(5):505-509.
 
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