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基于控制权动态配置视角的可转债融资治理效应研究

发表时间:2014-05-31  浏览量:1638  下载量:514
全部作者: 徐细雄,常梦梦,林丁健
作者单位: 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院
摘 要: 基于可转债融资治理效应的理论阐释,结合经济转型期我国上市公司控制权私利普遍存在的制度背景,研究突破传统现金流思路,从控制权视角构建了一个三时刻两阶段博弈模型,揭示了可转债融资后的企业控制权配置属性特征及其对管理者和投资者双方行动策略的影响效应与实现机理。模型表明,企业发行可转债后,不同现金流信号下可转债持有人的转股决策导致控制权在投资者和管理者之间动态转移,这一控制权相机转移机制将诱导管理者采取有效率的事前行动策略,进而实现抑制控制权私利,保护投资者利益的治理目标。
关 键 词: 财务管理;可转债;控制权动态配置;控制权私利;治理效应
Title: Governance effect of convertible debt based on dynamic transfer of control right
Author: XU Xixiong, CHANG Mengmeng, LIN Dingjian
Organization: School of Economics & Business Administration, Chongqing University
Abstract: Based on theoretical analysis of the governance effect of convertible debt and prevalence of private benefits of control in Chinese listed companies, this paper breaks through traditional cash flow approach and builds a model from the angle of control rights to reveal the allocation of firm’s control right and its impact on both investors and managers after the issue of convertible debt. The results show that, with the issue of convertible debt, the equityswap decision of convertible debt holders under different cash flow conditions can lead to the dynamic transferring of control rights, which will induce manager’s optimal action and prevent them from appropriating private benefits of control, so as to achieve investor protection.
Key words: financial management; convertible debt; dynamic allocation of control right; private benefit of control; governance effect
发表期数: 2014年5月第10期
引用格式: 徐细雄,常梦梦,林丁健. 基于控制权动态配置视角的可转债融资治理效应研究[J]. 中国科技论文在线精品论文,2014,7(10):956-965.
 
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