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不同渠道权力结构下的双渠道供应链定价策略研究
发表时间：2015-04-30 浏览量：1755 下载量：736
| 全部作者： | 李莉，何洁，赵杰，姚瑞波 |
| 作者单位： | 南京理工大学经济管理学院；焦点科技股份有限公司 |
| 摘 要： | 以一个两层双渠道供应链为研究对象，构建基于消费者效用选择的双渠道定价模型，研究制造商和零售商地位对等、制造商占主导地位和零售商占主导地位3种情况下的双渠道商品定价问题，重点探讨消费者在网络直销渠道上对商品的感知程度与除价格外的其他购买成本这2个因素对均衡价格的影响，以此为制造企业开展双渠道运营提供决策支持。研究结果表明，制造商在网络渠道上的最优定价不一定总是高于零售商在传统渠道上的最优定价；制造商占主导地位和零售商占主导地位时的最优定价高于制造商和零售商地位对等时的最优定价；零售商的最优定价在制造商和零售商地位对等时最低，在零售商占主导地位时最高。 |
| 关 键 词： | 管理工程；博弈模型; 双渠道；渠道权利结构 |
| Title： | Study on pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain under different channel power structures |
| Author： | LI Li，HE Jie，ZHAO Jie，YAO Ruibo |
| Organization： | School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology; Focus Technology Co. Ltd. |
| Abstract： | We study a two-layer dual-channel supply chain and build a pricing model based on the consumer utility and selection. In order to provide decision support for the manufactures, we focus on the pricing issues for the supply chain and profit for the supply chain members in three cases such as the manufacturer and the retailer are in a status of peer-to-peer, the manufacturer works as the leader and the retailer works as the leader. We emphasize the effects of two factors i.e. perception degree of consumer for goods and other purchase cost besides price on the equilibrium price, and provide decision support for manufacturing enterprises to carry out the double channel operation. The result shows that the manufacturer’s optimal price on direct channel is not necessarily higher than the retailer’s optimal price on tradition channel. Besides, for the manufacturer, their optimal price are the lowest when they are in a status of peer-to-peer; and for the retailer, their optimal price are the lowest when they are in a status of peer-to-peer, and are the highest when the retailer works as the leader. |
| Key words： | management engineering; game model; dual-channel; channel power structure |
| 发表期数： | 2015年4月第8期 |
| 引用格式： | 李莉，何洁，赵杰，等. 不同渠道权力结构下的双渠道供应链定价策略研究[J]. 中国科技论文在线精品论文，2015，8（8）：811-820. |
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