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经理人公平偏好对管理防御行为影响的实验研究
发表时间：2018-08-15 浏览量：1169 下载量：170
| 全部作者： | 李秉祥，牛晓琴 |
| 作者单位： | 西安理工大学经济与管理学院；上海应用技术大学经济与管理学院 |
| 摘 要： | 为解决经理人的代理道德风险问题，本文基于公平偏好理论，通过实验研究方法探讨了经理人横向公平偏好与纵向公平偏好对经理管理防御行为的影响。结果表明，公平偏好对经理人决策行为的影响十分显著。经理人薪酬公平性越低，其管理防御程度越高。当经理人薪酬与股东收益差距较大时，高能力经理人表现出较高的敏感性；当经理人与经理人市场薪酬差距较大时，低能力经理人表现出较高的敏感性。研究结论可为企业通过公平性的激励机制来抑制经理管理防御行为提供理论依据，降低企业委托代理成本。 |
| 关 键 词： | 管理心理学；公平偏好；管理防御；曲线估计；实验研究 |
| Title： | Effect of manager’s fairness preference on managerial entrenchment behavior: an experimental study |
| Author： | LI Bingxiang, NIU Xiaoqin |
| Organization： | School of Economics and Management, Xi’an University of Technology; School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Institute of Technology |
| Abstract： | In order to solve the manager’s agent moral hazard problems, the paper experimentally investigated the effect of the manager’s vertical and horizontal fairness preferences on the managerial entrenchment behavior based on fairness preference. The results indicated that the effect of manager’s fairness preference had a great significance on decision behavior indeed. The worse managers compensation fairness became, the greater the degree of managerial entrenchment was. A large pay gap between managers and shareholders resulted in a higher sensitivity in high-ability managers, while a large pay gap between managers and managers marketing compensation leaded to a higher sensitivity in low-ability managers. Thus, the results can provide reliable theoretical basis for the enterprise to restrain the managerial entrenchment behavior through a fair incentive mechanism and to reduce the agency cost. |
| Key words： | management psychology; fairness preference; managerial entrenchment; curve estimation; experimental study |
| 发表期数： | 2018年8月第15期 |
| 引用格式： | 李秉祥，牛晓琴. 经理人公平偏好对管理防御行为影响的实验研究[J]. 中国科技论文在线精品论文，2018，11（15）：1564-1579. |
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