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基于公平偏好的国企高管最优组合激励研究
发表时间：2013-05-31 浏览量：1459 下载量：621
| 全部作者： | 晏艳阳，金鹏 |
| 作者单位： | 湖南大学金融与统计学院 |
| 摘 要： | 针对国有企业，同时考虑显性合约和隐性合约的激励组合，将高管的公平偏好引入到激励组合模型中，基于重复博弈关系，研究公平偏好下国企高管的激励组合问题。研究表明：高管公平偏好先影响隐性合约，然后在隐性合约的替代关系下间接影响显性合约，最终使其显性薪酬逐渐向公平工资回归，在此过程中，隐性合约的变化幅度大于显性合约。高管的同情偏好有利于促进隐性合约的实施，它不仅放松了一阶最优条件，而且即使客观业绩目标完美，政府主管部门也有可能实施隐性合约，放弃显性合约。 |
| 关 键 词： | 管理理论；最优激励组合；公平偏好理论；国有企业；隐性激励 |
| Title： | Research on optimal incentive combination of SOEs’executive based on fairness preference |
| Author： | YAN Yanyang, JIN Peng |
| Organization： | College of Finance and Statistics, Hunan University |
| Abstract： | In the background of SOEs’ executive, this paper studied the problem of incentive combination of SOEs’ executive based on the executive fairness preference in the repeated game by introducing agent’s fairness into the combination of explicit contract and implicit contract. The results showed that the fairness preference influenced implicit contract firstly, then influenced explicit contract indirectly by the implicit contract substitution，finally made explicit compensation turn into fairness compensation. In this process, the variation of implicit contract was more than that of explicit contract. The results also showed that compassion was an important enforcement device on implicit contract, which not only relaxed the condition of first best optimal, but also positively implemented implicit contract instead of explicit contract, even though objective performance measure was perfect. |
| Key words： | management theory; optimal incentive combination; fairness preference theory; SOEs’ executive; implicit incentive |
| 发表期数： | 2013年5月第10期 |
| 引用格式： | 晏艳阳，金鹏. 基于公平偏好的国企高管最优组合激励研究[J]. 中国科技论文在线精品论文，2013，6（10）：880-888. |
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